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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Rules on ‘standing’ are important for at least four 
reasons. First, and most obviously, these rules tell us 
who may raise an action for judicial review. Second, 
because they determine who has the legal right to 
defend and assert rights and interests in court, it 
follows that rules on standing are fundamental to 
the question of access to justice. Third, these rules 
can be useful gatekeepers for a number of reasons, 
including: to protect courts from claims that waste 
their time or resources; to protect decision-making 
processes from the potentially distorting influence 
of vested interests, pressure groups or interfering 
busybodies; or, to protect decision-makers and 
those third parties reliant on their decisions from 
undue delay and uncertainty. Fourth, rules on 
standing shape the function of judicial review – 
whether the role of the courts is a narrow one, to 
protect the holders of individual or private rights 
against interference by the state, or whether judicial 
review exists to defend the public’s interest more 
broadly in good administration conducted in 
accordance with the rule of law. 
 
Precisely where the line is drawn between those 
whose connection to an administrative decision is 
sufficient to give rise to judicial review proceedings, 




It might appear that at first sight that such 
rules are necessary to prevent the frivolous or 
vexatious claimant from troubling the 
already overburdened courts or disrupting 
unduly the administrative process. However, 
it is just as undesirable for such rules to be 
constructed too narrowly, having the effect of 
providing yet another obstacle to obtaining 
relief and excluding from a remedy all but the 
most directly affected applicants1.  
 
In Scotland, until recently, the rules on standing 
have been drawn narrowly and applied restrictively 
to those seeking to challenge administrative 
decision-making in the public interest.  
 
A combination of developments – first by the 
Supreme Court in its development of the common 
law test for standing, and then by the Scottish 
Parliament putting that new test on a statutory 
footing – have now reformed the law in a way that 
is much more favourable to strategic litigants. 
Whilst other important barriers to judicial review 
remain – most significantly, cost2 – the effect of 
recent reforms3 are such that the question of 
standing should not present a significant hurdle for 
petitioners whose interest in a case is more than 
that of the ‘mere busybody’4.  
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However, the test for standing remains a restrictive 
one for strategic litigants seeking to raise a 
challenge on European Convention on Human 
Rights grounds under the Human Rights Act 1998 or 
the Scotland Act 1998. There is some room within 
the current rules to allow for a degree of strategic 
litigation, whilst current developments and debate 
around the statutory human rights framework in 
Scotland present an opportunity to adopt a more 
expansive test than is currently the case.     
 
2. THE STATUTORY TEST FOR  
STANDING IN SCOTS LAW 
 
The current test for standing is set out in section 
27B(2)(a) of the Court of Session Act 1988, as 
amended by section 89 of the Court Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2014. There it is established that the 
Court of Session may only grant permission to 
proceed to judicial review where it is satisfied that 
‘the applicant can demonstrate a sufficient interest 
in the subject matter of the application’ (emphasis 
added). 
 
Read on its own, the 2014 Act is only so helpful: it 
does not define what constitutes a ‘sufficient’ 
interest for these purposes. However, what is clear 
from reading around the statute is that the 
intention was for the courts to apply the test in a 
permissive rather than a restrictive way.  
 
First, in their report which gave rise to the new 
statutory test, the Scottish Civil Courts Review 
concluded that the ‘current restrictive approach of 
Scots law [to the question of standing] makes it 
difficult for campaigning groups to bring 
proceedings to test the lawfulness of controversial 
policies or decisions of public bodies’ and on that 
basis recommended the adoption of a sufficient 
interest test5.   
 
Second, the explanatory note to section 89 of the 
2014 Act makes explicit reference to the Supreme 
Court’s prior reform of the law in AXA. There, the 
Scottish Justices, Lord Hope and Lord Reed, sought 
to ‘put an end to the unduly restrictive approach to 
standing [in Scotland] which had too often 
obstructed the proper administration of justice’6 – 
and the explanatory note states that the new 
statutory test of sufficient interest reflects the 
liberalisation of the rules on standing at common 
law.    
 
3.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF  
COMMON LAW APPROACHES  
TO STANDING IN SCOTS LAW 
 
a.The traditional (pre-AXA) approach to  
    standing in Scots law 
 
Until AXA the Scottish courts had taken a narrow 
approach to the question of standing, applying a 
two-step test of title and interest that was 
established long before the emergence of public 
law as a distinct field of study and of practice. 
Firmly grounded in the private law tradition, these 
tests were highly restrictive to individuals or groups 
acting in the public interest rather than to enforce 
or to protect a private right.   
 
These tests could occasionally accommodate 
public interest challenges but in general the 
requirement for strategic litigants to demonstrate 
both title and interest was an unduly onerous one. 
For example: 
 
• In Rape Crisis Centre v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department7 Lord Clarke indicated 
that the Rape Crisis Centre would have had an 
interest in the decision to allow the boxer and 
convicted rapist, Mike Tyson, to enter the UK to 
compete in a boxing match but that they lacked 
title to sue. ‘It is a fallacy,’ Lord Clarke said, ‘to 
suppose that because of the public interest in 
ministers acting lawfully and fairly that public 
interest by itself confers on every member of the 
public a right to challenge a minister’s act or 
decision’8.     
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• In Scottish Old People’s Welfare Council, 
Petitioners9, a voluntary association who sought 
to promote the interests of old people in 
Scotland had title to challenge the validity of a 
circular issued by the Chief Adjudication Officer 
that would have the effect of restricting the 
circumstances in which cold weather payments 
might be made, on the basis that ‘any member 
of the public has at least title to sue’ where ‘the 
purpose of legislation is to make state benefit 
available to any member of the public who may 
qualify for it’10. However, the group lacked a 
qualifying interest being not ‘a body of potential 
claimants but…a body working to protect and 
advance the interests of the aged’ more 
generally.11   
 
This restrictive position gave rise to two significant 
criticisms. First, the practical problem that public 
interest cases that ought to have been raised in the 
Scottish courts were instead being brought in 
England where the threshold for standing was set 
much lower.12 Second, the principled problem that, 
in the absence of a petitioner with an enforceable 
right at stake, there would be ‘no means under the 
Scottish system of obtaining from the courts an 
effective remedy’ against unlawful decision-
making.13 
 
b. The liberalisation of standing in Scots  
     law by the Supreme Court in AXA 
 
The Scots law approach to standing was 
significantly reformed in 2011 by Lord Hope and 
Lord Reed in what is now the leading Supreme 
Court case on standing: AXA General Insurance v 
Lord Advocate.  
 
For Lord Hope in AXA: 
 
It [was] hard to see the justification for 
applying [a] test…which is rooted in private 
law to proceedings which lie in the field of 
public law.14   
Instead, his Lordship argued for a new test that 
would not ‘be based on the concept of rights, but,’ 
reflecting the more liberal test in England and 
Wales, ‘must be based on the concept of interests’15. 
For Lord Reed, because ‘[a] public authority can 
violate the rule of law without infringing the rights 
of any individual’ the restrictive approach to 
standing was ‘incompatible with the courts’ 
function of preserving the rule of law’16. Here, 
drawing a direct parallel with the approach taken in 
England and Wales, Lord Reed adopted the 
terminology of standing, based on sufficient 
interest17. For Lord Hope, the words ‘directly 
affected’, construed broadly to include those acting 
with genuine concern for the public interest even in 
the absence of any private right or interest of their 
own, were appropriate.18 
 
A difference of terminology aside, the thrust of 
the change here was clear: judicial review in 
Scotland would no longer be at base about the 
enforcement of private rights and the remedy of 
individual grievances. Instead, it would be about 
the correction of the abuse of power and the 
remedy of public wrongs.  
 
4. UNDERSTANDING CONTEXT: 
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE  
SUFFICIENT INTEREST TEST  
IN THE SCOTTISH COURTS  
POST-AXA 
 
What constitutes a sufficient interest to raise an 
action for judicial review depends upon the context 
in which the impugned decision is situated. In some 
circumstances, Lord Reed in AXA said, it might be 
‘appropriate to require an applicant for judicial 
review to demonstrate that he has a particular 
interest in the matter complained of.’ However, in 
other contexts, ‘such as where the excess or misuse 
of power affects the public generally,’ to insist upon 
a particular interest ‘might disable the court from 
performing its function to protect the rule of law’19.  
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The Court of Session has had the opportunity in a 
handful of cases to develop the contextual 
approach set out in AXA, and strategic litigants 
ought to pay heed to the guidance that the Court 
has offered as to what may be required to justify 
the sufficient interest test. For example: 
 
• In Walton v Scottish Ministers20, a 
statutory appeal rather than a judicial 
review21, Mr Walton sought to challenge the 
validity of certain orders and schemes made 
in relation to the construction of a new road 
network on the periphery of Aberdeen. In 
determining whether he was (in the language 
of the relevant statute) a ‘person aggrieved’ 
and therefore entitled to raise proceedings, 
the Inner House (the Scottish court) held 
that Mr Walton had failed to demonstrate 
that the construction of the road had any 
substantial impact upon his interests, or 
would negatively affect his property. The 
Court went on to add that, had this been a 
petition for judicial review and not a statutory 
appeal, Mr Walton would likely have lacked 
sufficient interest at common law, not least 
because of the considerable geographical 
distance between his property and the new 
route22. However, when this case reached the 
Supreme Court, Lord Hope and Lord Reed 
gave short shrift to the narrow approach to 
sufficient interest adopted by the Inner 
House. Lord Reed took the opportunity to 
reinforce the spirit and the implications of 
AXA. He concluded that, in the context of the 
relevant decisions, the Inner House had 
adopted an unduly restrictive approach. Mr 
Walton, he noted, had demonstrated a 
genuine concern about the proposal and had 
been an active member in organisations 
concerned with the environment generally 
and with opposition to new route specifically, 
and so ought to have had standing as a party 
with a sufficient interest. The Court’s 
constitutional function of maintaining the 
rule of law, Lord Reed said, could no longer be 
ignored by the Inner House in favour of ‘an 
approach which presupposed that the court’s 
supervisory jurisdiction was to redress 
individual grievances23.’ Lord Hope, in a 
colourful passage, demonstrated what is at 
stake with the example of a decision to erect 
a cluster of wind turbines that disturbs the 
habitual path of an osprey to and from its 
favourite fishing loch: 
 
Does the fact that this proposal cannot 
reasonably be said to affect any 
individual’s property rights or interests 
mean that it is not open to an 
individual to challenge the proposed 
development on this ground? That 
would seem to be contrary to the 
purpose of environmental law, which 
proceeds on the basis that the quality 
of the natural environment is of 
legitimate concern to everyone. The 
osprey has no means of taking that 
step on its own behalf, any more than 
any other wild creature. If its interests 
are to be protected someone has to be 
allowed to speak up on its behalf.24  
 
• In Sustainable Shetland v Scottish Ministers25 
the Inner House said that, notwithstanding the 
permissive approach to be adopted post-AXA: 
 
The range of persons able to enter the 
process remains limited to those who 
can show an interest in the outcome of 
the case; that is to say not in the 
potential legal reasoning employed by 
the court in reaching a decision, but in 
the decision itself.26 (Underline added)    
 
• In Jordanhill Community Council v Glasgow City 
Council27 any attempt by the respondents to 
resist the standing of the community council to 
challenge a new residential development would 
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have been rejected in the Outer House taking 
account of such factors as the development 
taking place within the community council’s 
area, the community council’s early 
representations made against the development, 
and the community council’s involvement as 
consultees at earlier stages in the development 
cycle. More generally, Lady Wolffe in this case 
said that the arguments made against the 
community council’s standing ‘hark[ed] back to 
an unduly restrictive approach to title…
reminiscent of what may have obtained pre-
AXA’28.    
 
That a proper interpretation of AXA and Walton 
required the Court of Session to take a qualitatively 
different approach to standing can be seen in the 
contrasting treatment given to that issue by the 
Outer and Inner Houses in McGinty v Scottish 
Ministers29. Marco McGinty, a keen birdwatcher and 
member of the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds, sought to challenge the designation of a new 
power station and transhipment hub at Hunterston 
as a ‘national development’, thereby giving it 
priority in any subsequent application for 
development consent, on the basis that statutory 
requirements for public consultation prior to 
designation were not complied with. In the Outer 
House, Lord Brailsford declined to delay his opinion 
until the Supreme Court’s judgment in AXA had 
been handed down, and – applying the test of title 
and interest – dismissed the petition. Whilst he 
took the view that Mr McGinty might have had title 
to sue in order to ‘prevent a breach by a public body 
of a duty owed to the public by that body’30, as an 
individual who resided some five miles from the 
land in question, and whose only connection to that 
land was to use it infrequently for recreational 
purposes, Lord Brailsford concluded that Mr 
McGinty could not be said to have had a ‘real and 
legitimate’ or ‘real and practical’ interest in the 
matter, capable of enforcement by the court31. 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in AXA, 
however, when the petition was reclaimed to the 
Inner House that court felt bound to adopt a 
different approach. Agreeing with Lord Reed that 
the rule of law would not be maintained if, because 
everyone was equally affected by an unlawful act, 
no-one was able to challenge it32, Lord Brodie held 
that, ‘applying the approach now desiderated by 
the Supreme Court’ it was no longer permissible to 
dismiss Mr McGinty as a mere busybody33. The court 
considered as relevant the petitioner’s concern for 
the environment and for the activity of 
birdwatching; his knowledge of both; and his 
willingness to make representations during any 
consultation process that preceded the decision.34 
 
Drummond et al, in a recently published 
practitioner’s guide to judicial review in Scotland35, 
note that since the law on standing was reformed 
challenges by respondents to the standing of 
petitioners in Scottish judicial review cases is less 
common36. However, for strategic litigants and their 
lawyers there remains a number of practical 
considerations and questions that should be 
addressed when giving thought to the question of 
standing under the new test: 
 
Once particular grounds have been 
identified, which person or people have 
standing on those grounds? Have each 
of the petitioners engaged with any 
consultation or public process 
beforehand? How many petitioners are 
required? If there is only one petitioner 
with a coalition or other supporters in 
the background, will that petitioner 
cope with the pressure? What 
agreement is in place for potential 
adverse financial consequences, and 
are all involved aware of those 
arrangements and risks? If there is 
more than one litigant, are there 
conflicts of interest between them as 
to the reasons why the action is being 
taken? How are instructions to be 
taken practically? Will the clients liaise 
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between themselves and nominate 
one person with sufficient authority, 
and has the solicitor seen this authority 
and acknowledged it in terms of 
engagement letters? If there is more 
than one person or organisation as a 
petitioner, is this required?...Lastly, it 
should not be forgotten that any 
interested parties may have to justify 
their standing before the court.37  
 
5. STANDING IN CASES WHICH  
ENGAGE ECHR RIGHTS 
 
Since the coming into force of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and the Scotland Act 1998, it has been 
possible to challenge public acts in Scottish courts 
on the basis that they have violated human rights 
contained in the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). Depending on where the legal 
authority for the alleged violation originated, 
applicants may bring proceedings under the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA) or the Scotland Act 1998. 
However, in both contexts, applicants must 
establish that they would be a victim for the 
purposes of article 34 of the Convention.38 It should 
be noted however, that there is some uncertainty 
over whether section 7 HRA applies merely to 
challenges to acts of public authorities under 
section 6 HRA or whether this restriction also 
applies where the claimant is seeking a declaration 
of incompatibility under section 4 HRA.39  
 
a. ‘Victim’ status under the ECHR 
 
Article 34 of the ECHR provides the following: 
 
The Court may receive application from 
any person, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals 
claiming to be the victim of a 
violation…
The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
has found that a victim must be directly affected by 
the alleged violation of which they are complaining. 
This means that general complaints, that allege a 
violation of ECHR rights in the abstract, are not 
admissible.40 Further, the Court has been explicit in 
ruling out any form of actio popularis – that is, 
public interest litigation not directly related to an 
individual victim.41  
 
Organisations are, however, able to apply to the 
Strasbourg Court if they themselves (not merely 
one of their members)42 can claim to be a victim of 
violation of one of the ECHR rights. The Court has 
also shown a degree of flexibility in its 
interpretation of ‘victim’, finding that applications 
can be made on behalf of individuals who have 
died (or disappeared) by their next of kin. In 
exceptional circumstances, the court has extended 
this principle to allow organisations with no formal 
legal relationship with the deceased to apply on 
behalf of individuals who have no next of kin,43 but 
only if the organisation has been de facto 
acknowledged as the individual’s representative in 
domestic proceedings.44  
 
It is also possible for organisations to act as a 
representative for specific individuals.45 In order to 
do so, they must produce signed, written authority 
to act46 and demonstrate that they have received 
specific and explicit instructions from the individual 
on whose behalf they purport to act.47  
 
Finally, the Court accepts amicus curiae submissions, 
sometimes called Public Interest Interventions or 
Third Party Interventions.48 Amicus curiae briefs are 
usually written submissions, occasionally oral 
submissions, that present the technical view on 
points of law, raise particular or additional issues of 
public interest, or of fact by a party not represented 
in the proceedings.49 Third party interventions have 
become an important means by which organisations 
with an interest in human rights protection can 
communicate with the Court.  
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b.‘Victim’ status in domestic law 
 
The ECHR does not require states to emulate the 
article 34 victim test. The protection system at 
Strasbourg is very much considered to be ‘a floor, 
not a ceiling’ and it is open to states to adopt a 
more generous definition of standing in 
domestic law for human rights proceedings.  
 
Indeed, other signatories to the ECHR have adopted 
broader rules on standing. For example, the 
environmental organisation Urgenda was allowed 
to bring a case in the Dutch courts in which it was 
successfully argued that the Dutch government’s 
(lack of) action on climate change breached their 
positive obligations in relation to articles 2 and 8 of 
the ECHR.50   
 
There is, therefore, no ECHR rule that prevents the 
rules on standing for human rights cases being 
broadened in Scotland. Indeed, the First Minister’s 
Advisory Group on Human Rights Leadership 
recommended that the potential new human rights 
law in Scotland should adopt the ‘broader test of 
“sufficient interest” to enable appropriate bodies 
such as non-governmental organisations and 
charities to bring proceedings.’51 Shortly after, the 
Scottish Government in their consultation on 
incorporation of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child into Scots law, also suggested that the 
test of ‘sufficient interest’ should apply in future 
UNCRC cases, a view supported by the majority of 
respondents to the consultation question.  
 
c. The standing of Human Rights Commissions  
    in the UK to raise proceedings 
 
The Scottish Human Rights Commission (SHRC), as 
a Scottish Public Authority, cannot be a victim for 
the purposes of article 34 ECHR. Thus, the SHRC 
may not bring a challenge on Convention rights 
grounds in domestic courts or at the European 
Court of Human Rights. Further, the SHRC is 
explicitly forbidden from assisting any person in 
claims or legal proceedings.52 However, it may 
intervene in civil legal proceedings if it considers 
that an issue arising is relevant to its general duty 
and raises a matter of public interest. The SHRC 
used this power for the first time in 2019.53  
 
The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 
(NIHRC) has legal standing to bring human rights 
proceedings under section 69(5)(b) of the Northern 
Ireland Act. This includes the ability to bring a case 
on behalf of an actual or potential named victim 
and to challenge legislation in abstract.54 The latter 
power was originally disputed by the Supreme 
Court, which found that section 71(2B) of the 
Northern Ireland Act required the NIHRC to identify 
an actual or potential named victim(s) when 
initiating proceedings55 – effectively ruling out the 
ability to challenge legislation in abstract. However, 
in response to this judgment, section 71(2B) was 
amended to clarify that the need to identify a 
victim only applied to proceedings under section 
7(1) HRA and not to abstract challenges.56  
 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(EHRC) also has the power to initiate or intervene in 
proceedings which challenge the compatibility of 
legislation with the ECHR.57 This appears to include 
challenges to legislation in the abstract and where 
a victim may be found.58 The EHRC has used its 
power to intervene on several occasions59 (including 
in the aforementioned NIHRC case)60 and has 
initiated proceedings on at least one occasion.61 
Under the Equality Act, the EHRC is entitled to 
undertake human rights cases in relation to 
devolved matters but only if it first obtains the 
consent of the SHRC. The EHRC has agreed that 
such consent will be sought whether the activity is 
undertaken directly by the EHRC or indirectly by 




Rules on standing are fundamental to access to 
justice. Without the right to raise an action all other 
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rights and interests that arise from access to the 
courts fall away. Since the reforms made to 
standing in Scottish public law litigation, first in 
AXA and then in the Court Reform (Scotland) Act 
2014, it is clear that both the Scottish Parliament 
and the UK Supreme Court intends for a liberal 
approach to ‘sufficient interest’ to be taken – more 
or less in line with the approach taken in England 
and Wales – and this has indeed been the case. 
Whilst it is not the case that public interest litigants 
can take their standing to raise an action for 
granted – the court will continue to repel 
interventions by ‘mere busybodies’62 and will look 
for indicators of interest such as proximity to or 
interest in the subject of the decision and its 
outcome, relevant expertise, and willingness to 
engage in any prior consultation exercises – the law 
on standing should not present a significant barrier 
to justice (though other such barriers remain). 
Whilst it might be seen to be advantageous to 
further define (and protect) the new more liberal 
test, whether by means of legislative amendment, 
statutory guidance or a change to court rules, the 
risk here is that any more granular definition might 
be used to narrow (or at least to close off the 
possibility of further expanding) the scope of the 
standing test. In this instance, (further) clarity 
might be the enemy of progress.    
 
Where an action is raised on Convention rights 
grounds under the Human Rights Act 1998 or the 
Scotland Act 1998 the narrow application of the 
‘victim’ test has proven to be restrictive. 
Recognising that this test is intended to be a floor 
rather than a ceiling there are a number of 
measures that might usefully be taken to improve 
the position of public interest litigants who might 
be better placed than vulnerable individuals or 
groups to spot violations and to act upon them 
within the relevant statutory time limits. These 
include an explicit shift in the statutory frameworks 
from a ‘victim’ test to a ‘sufficient interest’ test as 
well as conferring explicit powers on both the 
Scottish Human Rights Commission and on the 
Children and Young People’s Commissioner 
Scotland to raise actions in their own name. 
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